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INTRODUCTION

T

HE compensation of chief executive officers increased by a factor of six
over the last two decades,1 with the overwhelming share of the increase
coming not as salary but as "incentive pay," mostly in the form of stock
options and cash bonuses triggered by performance metrics. 2 Observers from
outside the corporate governance arena perceive a social problem and
question the magnitude of this raise. They worry about the fact that
executives in the United States are by far the world's best paid. 3 On the
domestic level, observers also worry about a growing inequality of income:
the average CEO of an S&P 500 company made thirty times more than the
4
average American production worker in 1970, but 210 times more in 1996.
Inside the world of corporate governance, the question is different, because
the level of compensation is not by itself seen as a problem. 5 Tournament
economics provides a widely accepted justification for supersize amounts.
The tournament sweeps in the entire set of aspiring executives, who then
compete for a small number of top-tier jobs. High-powered competition
6
ensues among executives, which is thought to result in better management.
1.

2.

3.

See Bengt Holmstr6m & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's
Rightand What's Wrong? 10 (ECG1 Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at
http://ssn.com/abstract-441100.
Average total remuneration of executives of S&P 500 companies (adjusted for inflation)
went from $850,000 in 1970 to $14 million in 2000, falling with the stock market to
$9,400,000 in 2002. At the same time, average base salaries merely doubled, going from
$850,000 to $2,200,000. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've
Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 24 25 (Harv. NOM
Working
Paper
No.
04 28,
2004),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/
abstract- 561305 [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy 20041.
See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the InternationalCEO Pa' Gap: Board Capture or Mlarket
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1171 (2004) (suggesting reasons to justify the transnational pay
gap).

4.

Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 51 (Apr. 1998) (unpublished manuscript),
available athttp://ssn.com/abstract-163914 [hereinafter Murphy 19981.

5.

LUCIAN BEBCIIUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY \\IIIIOUT PERFOR\LNCE:

iE

UNFULILLED

PROMISE O- EXECUI1VE COMPENSAT ION 5, 70 74 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004).

6.

See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AMi.ECON. REV. 845, 846, 857
(1981); see also Edward P. Lazear, OutputBased Pa'. Incentives, Retention or Soring? (1ZA
Discussion Paper No. 761, Apr. 2003), available at http://ssin.com/abstract-403900
[hereinafter Lazear 20031. Citing the absence of downside penalties, Lazear rejects the
notion that performance incentives have anything to do with observed executive pay
practices. He argues that equity based pay ameliorates information asymmetries. The
executive, an informational insider, trades less risky cash compensation for riskier equity
compensation in order to reassure outsiders. This leads to the prediction that equity based
compensation is more likely to appear when the firm's production function is little
understood. Lazear 2003 at 2 3.
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The corporate governance question is whether compensation mechanisms
within the winner's circle should be subject to exacting standards of incentive
compatibility. Critics of prevailing practices argue that large payoffs to
managers should be strictly conditioned on the creation of shareholder value.7
According to critics, prevailing arrangements fail to impose such conditions
because the bargaining framework is skewed in management's favor.8
Defenders of the prevailing practice answer that the governance framework is
effective, if not perfect. To support this view, they point to rational
risk/return trade-offs embodied in the contracts. 9
This article intervenes in the debate to assert that an evaluation of
compensation practices should concern more than the attributes of the
bargaining space. The discussants all posit the maximization of shareholder
value as the firm's objective and agree that such value can be enhanced by
aligning management's interests with those of the shareholders. A follow-up
question rarely arises: How should the shareholder-beneficiary be modeled
for the purpose of designing incentives? This Article unpacks the notion of
the shareholder, introducing a more particularized account in which the
unitary model of the shareholder disintegrates into a differentiated cast of
characters made up of investors, speculators, noise traders, fundamental value
investors, short-term holders, long-term holders, dumb money, and smart
money. The model is not only fragmented, but is also volatile, for different
shareholder types predominate in different firms and in different stock
markets. A normative question emerges concerning the design of equity

7.

Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried are the leading critics. See generals' BLBCI IUK &
FRIED, supra note 5. They build on a large antecedent literature. Before their appearance,
the leading critic was Professor Charles Elson, who for many years has been describing
pay practices as a function of board capture. See Charles M. Iilson, The Du' of Care,
Comnpensation, and Stock Ownershi, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 649, 651 (1995); Charles M. Ilson,

DirectorComnpensation and the Wanagement CapturedBoard The Histo0 ' of a S9'mptom and a Cure,
50 SMU L. REv. 127, 156 64 (1996). A management influence hypothesis has also

appeared in the economic literature. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendil Mullainathan, Agents
With and Without Princoals,90 AMi. E ON. REV. 203 (2000); Marianne Bertrand & Sendil
Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without PrincipalsAre, 116 Q J.
ICON. 901 (2001).
8.
9.

BEBCIIUK & FRIED, supranote 5, at 6, 9.

For a theoretical showing along these lines, see Benjamin 1. Hermalin, Trends in
Corporate Governance 13 20 (Sep. 3, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at

http://ssn.com/abstract-441360. in Hermalin's model, stepped up board monitoring
causes pay to increase in equilibrium. The insight is that stepped up monitoring decreases
the executive's expectations of job security and induces greater effort, because the

executive wants to induce a retention decision from the monitoring board. This reduces
the executive's utility, causing the executive to negotiate for higher pay.
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incentive compensation: What kind of a shareholder do we wish the
incentivized manager to be?
Most will agree that compensation should be designed to encourage
managers to take the view of a long-term, fundamental value investor, rather
than a short-term speculator sensitive to market moods. Yet prevailing
compensation practices align management interests with those of speculative,
short-term shareholders. Three possible perverse effects result, all well-known
in the compensation literature:() first, speculatively inclined managers can
rationalize investments in projects that decrease the long-term value of the
firm; second, speculative incentives encourage aggressive accounting and
distorted corporate reporting; and, third, speculative incentives skew payout
policy away from dividends toward open-market repurchases of firm stock,
with possible adverse consequences. Long-term restraints on the alienation of
equity awards, whether purchased through the exercise of stock options or
granted outright, would ameliorate all three problems. These are not seen in
practice because they diminish the value of equity grants by impairing liquidity
and inhibiting the reduction of risk by means of diversification.
Strict incentive compatibility, then, decreases the compensation value of
equity grants. A question accordingly arises concerning the appropriate
mediation of this conflict between compensation value and incentive effects.
Economic theory holds out no calculative solution; there is no general theory
11
of optimal incentive contracting with respect to corporate managers.
Pending such a theory's appearance, three alternative approaches can be
suggested. First, the imposition of alienation restraints can be offset by an
increase in the number of shares awarded, leaving the present value of
compensation unaffected. Here a question arises respecting the amount paid,
for at some point the value of the concession becomes unreasonably large.
Second, a decrease in value for the sake of incentive compatibility could be
deemed non-compensable as a normative proposition: Why should
shareholders have to pay more for correctly aligned incentives? In this case,
the problem lies in the tournament payoff, because at some point a pay cut
hurts the firm by dulling incentives. The third approach, which recognizes the
problems just noted, deems the matter ill suited to rule-based resolution and

10.
11.

See, e.g., Randall Thomas & Thomas Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock
Option Plans,35 WAE FORlSTi L. REv. 31, 40 46 (2000).
if we had such a theory, there would be nothing to dispute except the level of pay. See
Patrick Bolton, Jose Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Pa' for Short Tern Pefonance: Executive
Comensation in Speculative Markets 33 (ECG1 Finance Working Paper No. 79/2005, Apr.
2005), available at http://ssn.com/abstract- 691142.
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leaves it to case-by-case negotiation. Here, the problem lies in the flawed
bargaining context.
Although there is no theoretical template that correctly determines tradeoffs between compensation and incentive compatibility, economic theory
does hold out normative guidance. Equity grants make no sense when viewed
as pure compensation. If a supersize pay-package were the sole objective in
view, the shareholders would get more bang for their buck by paying cash.
Equity grants accordingly can be justified only to the extent that they hold out
positive incentive effects, effects that can be maximized only by imposing
retention constraints that detract from compensation value. An ordering of
priorities is implied. Incentive compatibility should come first, with the level
of compensation being set only in an incentive-compatible framework. So
long as corporate boards treat incentive-alignment and compensation as
coequal objectives, trade-offs will follow, and equity compensation schemes
will continue to hold out perverse incentives.
Part I describes behavioral variations in the shareholder population.
Inevitable uncertainty about valuation causes the shareholder in the
shareholder-value-maximization norm to fragment into diverse behavioral
types. The shareholder types are presented in a two-sided taxonomy that
distinguishes the speculative element (made up of noise traders, shorttermers, and dumb money) from the investment element (made up of
fundamental value holders, long-termers, and smart money).
Part II looks at stock option and bonus plans to see what kind of
shareholder they usher into corporate headquarters. Speculators emerge in
significant numbers, with negative implications for investment policy,
corporate reporting, and payout policy. Realigning incentives means placing
painful constraints on the liquidity of management stockholdings, and results
in a trade-off problem for the design of incentive compensation.
Part III shows that this Article's analysis holds negative implications for
both sides of the debate over executive pay. The critics look for a cure in
shareholder empowerment without pausing to ask about the incentives of the
interest holders thus empowered. Shareholder demands are volatile in time,
and the shareholder interest cannot always be relied upon for productive
instructions. The defenders justify the prevailing practice as a fair and rational
risk/return trade-off between the manager and the firm. In so doing,
however, they model the shareholder-manager no differently than the holder
of shares in a diversified mutual fund, and so fail to confront incentive
problems wrought into the contracting pattern.
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I. MODELING THE SHAREHOLDER
To value a share is to project returns and then find a factor with which to
discount them.1 2 The appraiser studies facts presently ascertainable about the
company, the industry, and the economy, 13 and then takes out a crystal ball.
Valuations are just guesses, albeit some better-calculated than others. That
being the case, it comes as no surprise that financial economics has never
managed to come up with a robust asset-pricing model.1 4 Absent such a
model, which would provide a means to verify present prices, there is much
room for behavioral variation, diversity of approach, and opinion among
shareholders on matters of valuation. And nearly all matters of concern to
shareholders ultimately come down to matters of value. Behaviorally
speaking, then, there is no unitary, empirical shareholder. One only can
describe a series of binary alternatives:

Speculation

Investment

Noise trading
Short term
Dumb money (smart money)

Fundamental value investment
Long term
Smart money (dumb money)

It follows that when the shareholder interest is called on to provide a
normative benchmark (whether to better align the incentives of executives or
for some other purpose), the shareholder must be modeled. Modeling means
choosing among the different shareholder types above. The choice proceeds
under constraint: one can mix and match characteristics from the various
rows and from either column, but if one includes too many characteristics
from both columns at once, a model providing a coherent normative
instruction will not emerge.
The shareholder is indeed modeled routinely in boardrooms and in
corporate and securities law. But the more particular attributes of such
shareholder constructs tend to be implicit, and often vary with the context or
over time. Securities law provides an example. Historically, it has regulated
from the perspective of the investment column, but has been increasingly

12.

See RICiARD A. BREALEY & SIE\\ART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF- CORPORATE 1FINANCE

13.

62 71 (6th ed. 2000).
See ZvIBODIE& ROBERT C. MERTON, 1INANCE 260 (2000) (describing firm specific risk).

14.

See Jeffrey Gordon & Lewis Konhauser, Efficient 11arkets, Cost'y Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761,771 786 (1985).
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solicitous of the speculative side during the last two decades. 15 Corporate law
presents a contrasting case. It often models its shareholder-beneficiary so
vaguely as to elide the problem of making menu choices. This is not
necessarily a failing; the governance problems on corporate law's table often
do not require further inquiry into the shareholders' financial and behavioral
profiles. For example, when the question is whether management should be
able to line its pockets with an unfair self-dealing transaction, the law may
fairly assume a unitary shareholder interest in a fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Sometimes, however, corporate law does model the shareholder interest more
particularly. For example, it draws selectively from the investment column in
articulating the law of takeover defense,16 aligning the long-term shareholder
with the manager against short-term speculators, so as to justify management
takeover defenses. There follows a more particular look at the columns and
the categories.
A. Speculation versus Investment
The typology's headings come from the classic conservative treatise on
finance and valuation, Graham and Dodd's Securi, Anajsis.1l Graham and
Dodd divided stockholders into two types. On one side, they placed those
who play the market looking for quick gains. Against this category of
speculators, Graham and Dodd contrasted a second category of investors,
which itself comprises two subsets. The more conservative subset of
investors looks for safe income streams, analyzing past performance and
avoiding any forward-looking projection. The less conservative subset looks
for capital appreciation rather than income, and invests based on projections
of future growth. They thereby resemble speculators, with the difference lying
15.

16.

17.

18.

Prior to 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission insisted that issuers disclose only
verifiable financial information. That conservative position was much criticized. See, e.g.,
Homer Kiripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some 'ths,
and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rlv.
1151, 1188 1191 (1970). The SEC eventually yielded, crafting a safe harbor rule for issuer
disclosures of projections. See Proposed Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act
Release No. 15,306 (Nov. 7, 1978); see also Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, Exchange Act Release No. 15,305 (Nov. 7, 1978).
Compare Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CiiI. L. REv. 1037 (2002),
with Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against the Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Cii. L.
REv. 973 (2002).
See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, inc. v. Time, inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989)
(approving defensive tender offer on the ground of protection of long term investment
plan).
BENIAMIN

GRAiiAM

&

DAVID

TECIINIQUE 33 36 (3d ed. 1951).

L.

DODD,

SECURIY

ANALYSIS:

PRINCIPLES AND
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in the approach taken. Investment in growth requires something "more
tangible than the psychology of the purchaser,"1 specifically the safety of the
principal and a satisfactory return, and these goals are best achieved by
thorough analysis. Such analysis has to address the quality of the company,
but it cannot stop there. Quantity, in the sense of the relation of the stock
price to the company's fundamental value, matters just as much. In Graham
and Dodd's picture, the market price is not necessarily the best available
evidence of the value on offer. Given a market full of speculators, it certainly
will not be: the best firm in the world is the issuer of just another speculative
stock if speculators have bid its price to the stratosphere.0
Investment, said Graham and Dodd, is "good for everybody and at all
times. ' 21 But speculation is not always bad, depending on who does the
speculating and the prevailing conditions. 22 Unfortunately, speculation often
turns out badly. The failure properly to distinguish between the two activities,
they said, brought about the disaster of 1929.23

B. Noise Trading versus Fundamental Value Investment
The essence of Graham and Dodd's distinction between speculation and
investment shows up in the contemporary noise-trading theory of stock
market pricing. 24 The noise theorists, looking to behavioral psychology,
divide the market into two types of shareholders: noise traders and
fundamental value investors. 25 The fundamental value investors closely
resemble the less-conservative subset of Graham and Dodd's investors. These
actors know that value lies in hard cash flows and invest into those flows
even as they look for growth. Their timelines tend to be longer, and their
information sets include only facts respecting the investee and the economy
(so-called "fundamental value information"), rather than the latest word from
Wall Street. Market trends and daily noise do not impress them.

19.
20.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38 39. Contemporary observers term their approach "value investing."

Warren

Buffett, a student of Graham and Dodd, is a famously successful exemplar. See ROGER
LO\\ENSEIN,

21.

BUFEi:

TiE MAKING

O

AN AMIERICAN

CAPIIALIS

36 59

(1995)

(describing Buffett's relationship with Graham).
GItIAIIM & DODD, supranote 18, at 34.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, 19, 19 22, 23 26 (1990).

25.

1or a leading model, see Joseph Lakonishok et al., ContrarianInvestment, Extrapolation, and
Risk, 49J. 1IN. 1541, 1542 44, 1575 76 (1994).
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The noise traders resemble Graham and Dodd's speculators, although
this model adds an overlay of psychology to reinforce the description of the
speculative mindset. Noise traders chase trends: when they see somebody
make a killing on a rising stock, they assume that actor to be smart rather than
lucky, and they imitate the strategy.26 Noise traders also display behavioral
biases. They are overconfident in their own investment abilities. 27 When the
stock price is trending upwards, they react too favorably to good news. Once
a downward trend becomes manifest, they react too unfavorably to bad news.
In both cases they suffer from availability bias and place too great a weight on
recent events and easily available information. 28 An availability bias also leads
noise traders to make poorly considered risk-return projections, in which they
underweight the importance of risks of low probability and high magnitude.
Finally, at the moment when the trend turns, noise traders can be slow to read
the handwriting on the wall. Their irrational inaction 29 results from a
hindsight bias, in which traders overweight past events that actually occurred,
rather than those that might have occurred.30
It also follows from
confirmation bias, which is the tendency to confirm earlier decisions
regardless of their intrinsic soundness. 3 1 Noise traders get embedded notions
about their strategies and shut out information.32
Trends dominate the resulting picture of market pricing.3 3 When the
market trends upward, too much is made of good news, and bad news is
filtered out. Indeed, market information may influence the price as much as
(or even more than) fundamental value information. Market information
most clearly dominates in a bubble, where a feedback loop takes over as one
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 24, at 28 30.
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals
for its Future, 51 Dui<E L. J. 1397, 1459 1460 (2001).
See Amos Tverskv & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainny:Heuristicsand Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124,1127-28 (1974).
See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and SophisticatedCustomers, 84 CAL. L. RLv. 627, 659 60 (1996).
See Baruch 1"ischhoff, Hindsiht Is Not EqualTo Foresiht: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncetainty, 104 J. IXPERINITNAL Psycii.: HUN. PERCEPTION &
PERFOR\A&NCE 288, 297 (1975).
See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization:The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequentl ConsideredEvidence, 37 J. PERSONALIIY
& Soc. Psyci. 2098, 2099 (1979).
The list of behavioral infirmities goes on. See generally Langevoort, supra note 29; Stephen J
Choi & Adam Pritchard, BehavioralEconomicsand the SEC, 56Si AN. L. REV. 1, 7 11 (2003).
1or models, see Nicholas C. Barbeis, Andei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Mtodel of Investor
Sentiment, 49 J. 1JiN. ECON. 307 (1998); Kent Daniel, David Hishleifer & Avanidhar
Subrahmanyam, Investor Pscholo' and Security Market Under and Overreactions, 53 J. 1IN.
1839 (1998).
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stock price increase feeds the next increase. 34 The trend turns only sometime
35
after information about fundamental value has ceased to justify the price.
Eventually the accumulation of bad news causes investors to substitute a new,
negative model. Then the trend turns downward, with investors thereafter
tending to underweight good news. 36
Restating the above in less formal terms, speculative investors experience
mood swings. Uncertainty is the ultimate cause: no shareholder, whether a
speculator or an investor, can ascertain fundamental value with surety, even
while staking significant sums in a highly competitive marketplace. Cool
rationality can turn out to be the behavioral exception rather than the rule.

C. Short Term versus Long Term
The speculative interest tends to have a short-term time horizon, with the
investment interest more likely to look long. This follows from their differing
behavioral characteristics. The market information that drives the speculators
bears primarily on the near term. The fundamental value that drives the
investment side tends to have meaning only over the intermediate or long
term.
The appellations "short term" and "long term" have come to stand in for
Graham and Dodd's terms "speculation" and "investment." The change in
usage has normative implications, as reference to a short-term time horizon
avoids the pejorative implication of the "speculation" label, 37 when coupled
with strong assumptions about the accuracy of market pricing. Under this
approach, widely prevalent in the 1 990s, 38 differing time-horizons hold out no
(2000).

34.

ROBERIJ. SIIILLER, IRRAIIONALIEXUBELANCE 44 68

35.

See Barberis et al., supra note 33, at 307 08 (describing price underreaction to news).

36.

ANDREI SIILEIEER, iNLIIICIlENT MARIKETs: AN 1NIRODUC ION To BuIIAVIO1AL 1FINANCE

37.

38.

113 14 (2000).
Graham and Dodd pointed out that there is no clear line separating the short and long
terms and that one can "invest" in the short term and "speculate" in the long term.
G1tAlIAM & DODD, supranote 18, at 35.
in the 1980s, in contrast, shareholder value maximization practices seemed to hold out
more of a threat to management's freedom to invest. See Michael E. Porter, CapitalChoices,
Changing the Way America Invests in Indust0 ', in Si uDIES IN 1NIERNAIIONAL GOVERNANCE
AND CORPO1tAIL 1FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTi'S 6 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997).
The leveraged restructuring movement denuded management of investment discretion,
even as it produced large present payments in the form of tribute to shareholders who
had long been starved of cash retuins. The restructurings' defenders argued that the
transactions had the beneficial effect of constraining management's tendency to invest
equity capital sub optimally, even as the transactions had the effect of taking the subject
firms private, thereby insulating them from left side shareholder influences. See Michael

Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation,HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. Oct. 1989, at 61, 65 72.
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complications for the model of the shareholder, and "shareholder value
maximization," when keyed to today's stock price, carries a positive
normative connotation. 39 Present-value theory brings all time horizons
together into today's market price, 40 and under the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH), today's price reflects fundamental value. 41 It follows that maximizing
today's stock price maximizes fundamental value and that directing
management to maximize present value holds out no risk of perverse effects.
The converse also obtains under this market-favorable view: maximizing
fundamental value maximizes today's stock price, so that management
confidently can invest for the long term without having to worry about being
42
punished by the speculative interest in the stock market.
Problems come up if the EMH drops out of the picture and market
underpricing and overpricing become possible. If the market price does not
automatically self-correct, then it can be driven in incorrect directions by
short-term, noise-trading shareholders. If pursuing a shareholder value
strategy causes management to align the business plan with these
shareholders' preferences, the result could be underinvestment in productive
projects and overinvestment in suboptimal projects.
D. Dumb Money versus Smart Money
The final binary-dumb money versus smart money-complicates the
typology's division of the world into speculators and investors, as indicated by
the parentheticals in the chart. The noise traders make up the core of the
The transactions' opponents claimed that high leverage entailed excessive agency costs
and choked off new investment. Eventually, history defused the issue by consigning high
leverage restructuring to its scrapheap. Leveraged restructuring came to be seen as shock
therapy incurred in the normative transition from post war managerialism to the superior
shareholder value regime of the 1990s, under which managers invested for the long term,
even as they adhered to a norm of present shareholder value maximization. See Bengt
Holmstr6m & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and 'ererActivi' in the United States:
Miaking Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 127 132 (2001).
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1278 87
(1999).
40. See Henr Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiducia0 ' Princles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv.
277, 288 90 (1990).
41. See WILLIAM\W. BRAriON,CORPORAE[INANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 154-55 (5th ed.
2003).
42. This assumes, of course, that management credibly can communicate its proprietax
information about future prospects to actors in the market. if it cannot, then a market
tendency to rely on short term performance numbers can have perverse effects. See
William W. Bratton, Compbarative Corporate Governance and the Theo0 ' of the Firm: The Case
Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. 'RANSNAI'L L. 213, 223 (1999).
39.
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dumb-money shareholders. But the category can also sweep in an uninformed
fundamental value investor-someone, for example, who collects stocks with
high price/earnings ratios in an underdiversified portfolio for the long term.
The core smart money investor is a well-informed fundamental value
investor. But the category includes speculative actors as well. Some smart
money will combine fundamental and market value information, watching the
noise traders and the market trend. When the noise traders push the market
upward, bidding up stocks in a feedback loop where an uptick is good news
that triggers another uptick, smart money certainly can ride along. After all,
there is money to be made as prices rise; thus did "momentum" funds make
an appearance in the institutional investment community during the 1990s.
But the smart money knows when fundamentals do not support the market
price and, being (relatively) free of behavioral biases, will be ready to be the
first to bail out when the trend turns. The same insights invite the smart
money to profit by bucking the trend. If fundamental value does not support
the market price, then the price inevitably falls. Accordingly, money can be
made by shorting the stock (or the whole market), or by buying puts. More
generally, given a lot of noise, some smart money will be contrarian.
In its contrarian posture, the smart money plays a key role in the scenario
cited in support of the EMH. The EMH asserts that the market price is the
best reflection of fundamental value and that new fundamental value
information gets into the stock price almost immediately, 43 even as it accepts
the existence of dumb money and noise trading. It can do both at once
because it asserts that smart money trumps dumb money. Dumb money goes
off in every direction, canceling itself out in the random-error term. Smart
money goes consistently in the direction of fundamental value, keeping stock
44
prices correctly aligned with fundamentals.
Under the EMH it follows that supply and demand do not determine
stock prices. What is on offer in the stock market is money in the future, and
demand for money is consistently high. The valuation questions go only to
the amount of money, the time of payment, and the quantum of riskquestions answered by fundamental value information. Since demand is a
constant, the only thing that can cause a price to change is new fundamental
value information. Noise traders, meanwhile, always get wiped out in the long
run.

43.

BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 12, at 354 62.

44.

BWXITN, supra note 41, at 159-67.
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Although the EMH continues to have defenders, 45 the contrasting noisetrading description of the market has been ascendant for more than a decade.
Erratic stock market behavior encouraged the shift. Under the present
consensus view, the stock market is a place where noisy supply and demand
intermix with fundamental value because there is not enough smart money to
trump the dumb money in the short term.

46

Contrarian investment is just too

risky. Overpricing and underpricing are constant possibilities. But in the long
run, fundamental value always prevails.
E. Summary: Shareholders and Fundamental Value
The division of shareholders into variegated speculators and investors
does not preclude the employment of a unitary model, depending on the
question presented. For example, all shareholders want managers to create
long-term fundamental value (or at least to be seen as so doing). To see why
this is the case, try to imagine a stock market bubble occurring in the absence
of a plausible fundamental value story. Absent the story, investors will have
no cause to get excited in the first place. Even the dot-com bubble of the late
1990s began within a fundamental value scenario. The Internet was new, and
more and more people were becoming acquainted with it, giving rise to the
reasonable projection that it would become an important center of
commerce. According to the story, that meant there were going to be
fantastic profits for a handful of winners who got in early with attractive
websites, gained market share, and established a brand. Unfortunately, the
story, although rational, also was highly probabilistic. Worse, it became
exaggerated in the telling, in the interpretation, and in the wake of actual stock
price increases. When the market puts present money on the table, the
connection between that market value and the supporting fundamental value
story can become attenuated. But the story has to be in place before the
market takes off; even at the crest of "tulipmania," there was an operative
47
fundamental value story.

All of this implies that for a stockholder, whether a noise trader or a
fundamental value investor, news about fundamental value always matters.
Beyond this base point, however, a unitary shareholder perspective on value
45. For a contemporary defense, see Eugene Fama, Mlarket Efficieng', Long Tenv Returns, and
Behaviol Finance, 49 J.FIN. ECON. 283, 284 85 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishnx, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN 35, 39 54
(1997).
47. Peter Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J.POL.EcON. 535, 555 57 (1989) (arguing that rare bulbs had
high fundamental value due to sales of offshoots).
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cannot be assumed. As the next part demonstrates, shareholder preferences
respecting investment policy, financial reporting, and payout policy vary with
behavioral characteristics, time horizons, and the state of the market.

II. THE VOLATILE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST AND
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
This part draws on the variant shareholder perspectives just described to
evaluate prevailing compensation practices. It asks two questions. First, what
sort of manager- shareholder is likely to be produced by prevailing incentive
compensation practices? Second, does the shareholder interest provide a
coherent normative yardstick with which to evaluate prevailing practices?
Section A outlines the terms of standard stock option plans, along with the
main points made by their critics. Section B asks how the plans affect
incentives to invest for the long term. Section C looks into the plans' impact
on financial reporting. Section D shows how stock option compensation
affects payout policy. Section E looks into the incentive compatibility of two
additional components of standard pay packages: cash bonuses and exit
payments. Section F summarizes.

A. Stock Option Plans: Prevailing Practice and Critique
48
Under prevailing practices, stock option plans have 10-year durations,
49
with options granted under the plans vesting gradually over the period.
When an option vests, the manager is free to exercise it and sell the stock.
The exercise price is the stock's market price at the time the option is granted.
The price remains fixed for the life of the option.11 Critics question both the
pricing and the vesting practices. 51

As to exercise prices, the critics make a simple behavioral point: higher
hurdles require greater effort and therefore hold out a bigger payoff for the
shareholders. If exercise prices were set higher than the market price, the
manager would have to create some value in order to put the option into the

48.
49.

Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 41.
YALE D. TAUBER & DONALD R. LEvy, ExrLCUTIVE COMPLNSAIION 663 (2002). \esting

usually occurs ratably over time, but could be based on performance incentives. Id.
50. Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 39.
51. Bebchuk and Fried also question the numbers granted. They think that fewer would be
better. According to the empirical evidence they cite, the positive incentive effect declines
as the number granted increases, so that the benefits of the last option granted may be
less than the cost. BEBCIIUK& FRIED, supra note 5, at 138.
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money. Yet, despite the apparent sacrifice of incentive effect, only a small
subset of companies price options out of the money, that is, above the market
price of the stock at grant. 52 The practice of leaving the price fixed for the
life of the option also arguably softens the incentive effect. A fixed price
rewards the executive for market-wide and sector-wide upward price
movement, in addition to upward movement due to the company's own
performance (which is said to account for only thirty percent of stock growth
on average). 53 So long as the market rises over time, a payoff is virtually
guaranteed. Indexing solves the problem. Under this, the exercise price is
reset upward and downward over time to filter out changes attributable to the
market or sector. Alternatively, vesting could be conditioned on meeting a
fixed performance target. 54 Neither palliative was much seen in practice
before 2003. Since then, mounting criticism has caused a minority of boards
55
to attach performance targets.
The critics also question the vesting rules. Once the option vests, the
executive is free to exercise it and sell the underlying stock. And executives do
sell ninety percent of the stock purchased upon exercise. 56 This, of course,
defeats the purpose of aligning their interests with that of the shareholders.
No nefarious intentions need be read in, however. The managers sell in order
to diversify their portfolios, acting no differently from other rational
investors. At the same time, nefarious deeds do occur. Executives use inside
5
information to time their sales. 1
Other common features of option plans come under fire, most notably
reloading and replacement. A reloading feature automatically grants the
beneficiary a new option for every option exercised, with the exercise price
set at the stock's price at the time of reloading. According to the critics, the
new option can serve as a form of protection against subsequent price
volatility respecting the shares purchased. So long as the stock price spikes

52. Id. at 160.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id. at 139 42.
55.

56.

57.

See Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay Afore Tightl to Performance, \ALL ST.

.

e.

21.

2006, at Ai (noting that "30 of 100 major U.S. corporations" base a "portion" of equity
grants on performance targets, up from seventeen in 2003, but that the targets tend to
remain undisclosed).
Id. at 176 77. Stock sales are not the only problem. Executives also can employ derivative
contracts to put themselves in the economic position of diversified stockholders, even as
they continue to own the stock purchased under the plan. See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing
Reform: The Derivatives VMarket and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL. Bus. L.J. 301, 323 24
(1995) (describing risk shifting in the derivatives market).
BEBCIIUK& IRIED, supra note 5, at 179 83, 191.
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above the exercise price of the replacement option during its life, the
executive gets a chance to profit on the stock purchased, even if overall price
trend is downward. Stock price volatility thereby becomes a potential source
of personal profit. 51 Replacement occurs when options expire out of the
money. The firm creates new options to replace them, with the exercise price
pegged at the lower market price at the time of the replacement grant. 59 The
critics assert that this insures against performance failure and works at crosspurposes with the original option, which was granted to discourage the stock
,0
price decline that triggers the new option grant.
As a theoretical matter, many of the criticisms are as contestable as is the
prevailing practice. As already noted, we have no ironclad theory of optimal
incentive contracting. If we did, the theory would tell us how to design the
61
contracts, and there would be nothing to dispute except the level of pay.
Absent a theory, there is room for debate about means to induce the
productive incentives. As to exercise prices, it can be noted that the stock
price at the time of the option grant reflects the market's present expectation
about all future value scenarios, 6 2 expectations shaped in light of the incentive
compensation scheme. Strictly speaking, as the option goes into the money,
value has been created with the executive's participation. As to the absence of
indexing, it has been argued that there may be reason to reward executives for
general market increases: the value of good managers may go up during good
times, 6 3 creating a retention incentive. Even reloading could be the means to
the end of an optimal long-term incentive arrangement.6 4 Perhaps the
additional options also have a positive effect; it all depends on the overall mix
of incentives, and nobody has a guiding template. Finally, replacement
options may not look plausible ew ante, but ew post, at the time of expiration,
65
new options import continued incentives to succeed.
None of these back-and-forth arguments can be settled here. But a
complex model of the shareholder does sharpen one's understanding of the
stakes. The following sections take up three matters particularly likely to
trigger conflicting interests within the group of shareholders, namely
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 169 70.
Formerly, the result also was accomplished by amending the plan to lower the price, a
practice that ceased when the Financial Accounting Standards Board changed the
accounting treatment in 1998. Id. at 165 67.
See Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 43.
See Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 11, at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 37.

64.

Id. at 35.

65.

Id. at 36.
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investment policy, reporting practice, and payout policy. In all of these cases,
the particular shareholder incentive profile fostered by an equity
compensation scheme can skew the firm's choices in unproductive directions.
B. Investment Policy
Hypothesize a choice of investments. The firm can invest in a line of
business much favored in the stock market-say, a broadband network or
internet access business in the late 1990s. Alternatively, it can invest in a less
glamorous extension of its core business. The firm does not have the capacity
to make both investments. Its managers know three things: (1) that the
market will reward the glamorous investment in the near term; (2) that the
glamorous investment is highly risky; and (3) that the firm's capital-budgeting
analysis yields a slightly higher present value for the less-glamorous
66
investment in the core business.
In theory, the firm should make the less glamorous investment due to its
higher net present value. Only an irrationally risk-prone actor would opt for
glamour. A properly designed equity compensation scheme should not cause
the firm's managers to stray from this rational choice.
Stock option compensation is defended on the theory that it encourages
the very risk-neutral investment policy favored in financial economic theory.
It does so by counterbalancing the perverse effects of straight salary.
Managers on straight salary are thought to tend toward risk aversion. They
have an undiversifiable human capital investment in the firm and a
consequent interest in institutional stability. This contrasts with the interest of
the shareholders, who tend to hold well-diversified portfolios and approach
risk neutrality in their evaluation of new investments. The conflict of interest
ripens when the managers choose a low-risk, low-return investment instead of
the high-risk, high-return investment preferred by the shareholders. Stock
options counterbalance the managers' risk-averse tendencies by holding out
the possibility of future stock ownership. 6
But they do not thereby
automatically make managers risk-neutral. Prior to an option's expiration or
exercise, its holder is benefited by an increase in the underlying asset's
volatility; high volatility enhances the probability of exercise in the money.
This creates a potential problem. High-risk choices made from an option
holder's perspective may be too risky, decreasing the firm's long-term

66.
67.

The analysis applies a higher discount rate to the glamour investment to compensate for
its increased risk, with the higher rate resulting in a lower net present value.
See Thomas & Martin, supra note 10, at 38 40.

72

Virginia Law & Business Review

1:55 (2006)

fundamental value even as they make the option more valuable. This is just
the possibility held out by the glamour investment in the hypothetical.
Defenders of standard stock option plans acknowledge the problem,
counseling that the solution lies in setting the right mix between options
granted and the flow of straight salary tied to the managers' low-risk human
6
capital investment. 8
Although the theory may well be sound, realizing the theoretically correct
mix of incentives presents a serious practical problem. To see why, let us
examine the hypothetical from the various shareholders' points of view.
We begin on the investment side. A long-term shareholder will want
management to expand the core competency, despite the short-term
opportunity cost to the stock price. On a long-term basis, the core investment
causes the stock price to be higher. A fundamental value investor, viewed
without regard to the time horizon, will make the same choice, because
dispassionate risk appraisal shows the investment to be more valuable. But a
caveat must be entered: a smart fundamental value investor with a short time
horizon might see things differently, opting for a near-term bump in the stock
price.
The noise trader and the short-term holder also will see things differently.
The market's near-term reaction matters greatly to both of them, so both
favor the glamour investment. Dumb money, impressed by a stock price
uptick, also will favor glamour; indeed, additional dumb money might be
induced to invest in the wake of the glamour investment's announcement,
further driving up the stock price.
If the firm makes the glamour investment, some smart money observers
will conclude that the market overvalues it and short the stock. If the smart
money thereby corrects the overvaluation, there is little risk that stock option
compensation will encourage suboptimal investing by the firm. But how
much smart money will be out there to perform the price correction
function? The investment decisions of publicly-traded firms tend to be
opaque. Their periodic reports do not lay out precise decision parameters
such as those assumed in the hypothetical. Accordingly, to perform its job of
correcting prices, the smart money needs to be more conversant with the
fundamentals of the firm's business than any reference to publicly available
information permits. Quite apart from the costs and risks of short positions,
smart money will not necessarily be available to correct the stock price.
We now turn to the managers, assuming them to be the beneficiaries of a
generous, conventional stock option plan in the middle of its term. They hold
68.

Id. at 40.
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vested, exercisable options, unvested options that can be exercised in the near
term, and unvested options that can be exercised only in the intermediate
term. They also hold firm stock purchased through the past exercise of
options. How these holdings affect the investment decision depends on the
numbers projected and the managers' personal preferences. From a longterm, fundamental value point of view, the glamour investment is suboptimal.
But it also will cause the stock price to be significantly higher in the short
term. If the executives are ready to sell the stock they now own or will soon
acquire through option exercise during the period in which the firm's stock is
overpriced due to the glamour investment, they have an incentive to choose
it. If, on the other hand, the glamour investment is so risky that it holds out a
possibility of future distress, they may reject it because their job-term
projections extend into the intermediate or long terms.
Three points emerge from this exercise. First, the shareholder interest
does not necessarily send a clear signal on the choice of investment. Second,
conventional stock option compensation does not necessarily direct managers
to the creation of long-term fundamental value. Third, managers make stockprice-based calculations from a smart money position. Even if they realize
that the glamour investment presents significant negative long-term
possibilities, they may opt for it anyway, knowing that they can adjust their
stockholdings during the projected period of overvaluation. They can even
act before astute market players. There arises a high risk of opportunism.
Two adjustments advocated by the critics of stock option plans address
these problems. First, vesting practices could be changed so that the
managers are locked into long-term positions in the stock. Plans have typically
required executives to retain a minimum amount of stock, but the minimums
set have been too low to be meaningful.6 Stricter retention policies have
been mooted, 7 ) but it is too early to tell whether these will significantly
constrain an executive's tendency to dispose of stock in the wake of option
exercise. Second, executives could be forced to disclose their stock sales in
advance (rather than after the fact) so as to minimize their smart money
advantage and increase the stock of information moving market prices in
71
correct directions.
69.
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68. Late reporting of stock sales was a particularly acute problem where the company had
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Some advocate a different approach, suggesting that stock options be
abandoned and replaced by restricted stock plans. These award the stock
outright and thus ameliorate perverse effects respecting investment policy. As
has been noted, options gain value as the firm's stock becomes more volatile,
perversely tying executive wealth to stock volatility. To the extent that the
executives' risk-averse attachment to their jobs does not counteract this
incentive, a problem is presented. Restricted stock addresses the problem by
importing more stable incentives. Where options allow for value only in the
event that the stock price exceeds the exercise price after vesting and before
expiration, long positions in stock have value on both the upside and the
downside.72
The restricted stock argument is correct so far as it goes, subject to the
important caveat that the substitution of long holdings for options does not
by itself achieve incentive compatibility. Note that the managers in the
hypothetical have long holdings of the stock from past option exercises in
addition to options under the present plan. So long as the executives hold
significant numbers of shares that may freely be sold in the overpriced
market, the sub-optimal glamour investment may make them better off.
Absent retention constraints on those long holdings, the incentive problem
remains unsolved. The same goes for restricted stock plans.
Restricted stock has an additional shortcoming. As compared to stock
options, it holds out an opportunity cost respecting incentives to create
value.7 3 Restricted stock amounts to an option with an exercise price of zero,
and there is no reason to believe zero is an optimal exercise price.74 To see
the point, compare the award of an option to buy 100 shares at $100 and an
outright grant of 100 shares, both awarded with the stock trading at $100.
Assume that the stock price declines to $80 on the day after the grant and
stays at $80 forever because the firm is badly managed. The holder of the

Before the statue's enactment, the loans were often forgiven, along with a gross up to
cover the income tax payable on loan forgiveness. BEBCIIUK & IRIED, supra note 5, at
116. Alternatively, the executive would borrow money from the fhm to exercise stock
options and later put the stock back to the firm to repay the loan, taking advantage of a
pre SOX loophole that permitted the executive's report of the stock sale to be delayed
until forty five days after the end of the fiscal year. Id. at 117.

72. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options 19 (Harvard NOM
Working Paper No. 03 33, 2003), available at http://ssn.com/abstract-415040
[hereinafter Hall & Murphy 20031 . The corporate world's failure to take advantage of
these asserted benefits can be explained in part by reference to accounting and tax
regimes, which have pushed preferences in the direction of options. Id. at 24.
73. See REDAEI AL., supra note 69, at 244.
74. BEBCIIUK & FRIED, supranote 5, at 170 71; Jensen & Murphy 2004, supranote 2, at 58.
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option is wiped out; the holder of the stock emerges with 80 cents on the
dollar despite poor performance.
These value implications help explain the trend toward restricted stock
over the past several years.15 From one point of view, it looks like a healthy
reaction to option-related excesses of the 1990s. But, at a time when stock
market averages show little forward motion, it also neatly dovetails with the
self-interest of management. In a retrenching market, restricted stock
increases net management compensation, not only as compared to the
alternative of indexed options but even as compared to conventional, fixedprice options. The restricted stock alternative accordingly makes economic
sense only if the grants are conditioned on the firm's meeting strict
performance targets, or, in the alternative, the firms take care to make the
grant in the form of a trade-off, with the executive taking the stock in lieu of
cash salary or bonus payments otherwise to be received.76
In sum, given variegated shareholders and the possibility of market
mispricing, equity compensation holds out negative possibilities respecting
investment policy. The incentive problem is time-sensitive: mispricing occurs
in the short and intermediate term, but in the long term, fundamental value
controls. It follows that time holds out the cure. Equity incentive schemes,
whether in option or long form, should restrict alienation so as to align the
incentives of managers with the long-term stock price, and thus the long-term
shareholder interest.
The analysis changes for a firm with underpriced stock. Here, two
scenarios present themselves. The first is benign. The firm's managers, as
smart money, have a strong incentive to hold until the stock price reaches
fundamental value, whatever the terms of the plan. The second scenario is
more troubling. Here, a lack of upward movement in the stock price induces
impatience and ill-advised investment in overpriced assets. Retention
constraints are irrelevant in the first case, but beneficial in the second. Acrossthe-board restrictions on alienation accordingly appear to be in order.
Just how long such retention constraints should endure is another
question, with the answer presumably varying from firm to firm, depending
on the nature of the business and the state of the market. A one-size-fits-all
standard still can be suggested: the executive should be required to retain an
amount of stock that is material in light of the executive's overall net worth
until a year after the termination of employment at the firm.

75.
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A final caveat should be entered. For most purposes, long-term stock
price enhancement and long-term fundamental value creation amount to
different terms for the same objective. However, they may send different
signals when an unwanted merger bid appears. The long-term fundamental
value objective has been used to justify management resistance to a premium
bid on the ground that the firm's long-term value under present management
exceeds the price offered by the bidder. The justification rings hollow in the
eyes of many because long-term fundamental value investors still tend to
favor the premium bid. In the hostile offer case, the conflict between longterm and short-term interests occurs not among the outside shareholders, but
between inside managers and the outside shareholders as a group. Prevailing
stock option practices help to realign managers' interests with those of the
outside shareholders. Significant, vested, and alienable equity stakes make
managers less likely to oppose the takeover. Thus did stock option
compensation apparently counteract the tendency to resist, facilitating
unprecedented numbers of friendly mergers during the 1990s.11 Strict,
enduring restraints on alienation would change this. Managers with an equity
interest that remains unvested in the wake of a takeover paid for in bidder
stock will have every reason to resist, preferring to leave the pursuit of longterm value in their own hands rather than those of a hostile stranger. A united
shareholder interest, then, would want revised vesting restrictions made
contingent on events in the control market.
C.

Quality of Financial Reports

Now consider the impact of equity-based compensation on
management's incentives respecting financial reporting. We take a simple,
relatively benign example of 1990s earnings management: the cookie-jar
reserve. The firm takes an extraordinary loss in a given quarter respecting an
unsuccessful line of business. The stock price effect of the bad news is muted
because the loss is a one-time-only affair. Given, say, a $15 billion company,
the market will not be overly concerned as between a write off of $1.5 billion
or $1.75 billion. So, management, which expects actual write-offs over time to
total $1.5 billion, tops up the present deduction from earnings to $1.75
billion. The extra $250 million goes to the cookie jar. In a later quarter when
the earnings come in a tad less than expected, management conveniently
revisits the loss reserve and reduces it. The released sum supports earnings in
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the later quarter."v A cookie-jar stash also can derive from any overestimated
cost; for example, unrealistically high estimates of any of sales returns, loan
79
losses, or warranty costs.
Managers in the 1990s held out the shareholder interest in justifying the
manipulation. First, investors prefer a time-series of smoothly increasing
income figures."' The drawdowns from the cookie jar let management
construct that steadily rising line of earnings, avoiding volatile income results
that mean a higher discount rate and a lower stock price. Such income
smoothing does not necessarily corrupt the trend, even as it beneficially
reduces volatility. And since the trend determines the long run value, any
misrepresentation is not material.
Managers cited the noise traders in the alternative. In the overheated
1990s market, the noise interest hyped every piece of news about
fundamental value to such a degree as to make it plausible to argue that
earnings management serves a higher shareholder interest. 81 If, to take a
much used example, the firm misses its expected quarterly earnings number
by one cent and the overheated market as a result punishes the stock by
bidding it down 10 percent, then a reserve that holds out the missing penny
benefits the shareholders. 82
It allows management to anticipate and
counteract the shareholders' behavioral shortcomings, protecting the stock
price from short-term market mood swings.

78. The use of the "big bath" write off to increase cookie jarreserves is constrained for

business exits commenced after December 31, 2002; liabilities incurred in respect of
closures must now be recognized upon incurrence and not in advance. ACCOUNIING IOR
CoSTs ASSOCIAIED \\ 1111

xIT OR DISPOSAL ACi mlIES, Statement of lin. Accounting

Standards No.146 (lin.Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
79. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at NYU Center for Law
and Business: The "Numbers Game" (Sep.28, 1998), availableathttp://www.sec.gov
/news/ speech/ speecharchive/ 1998/ spch220.txt.

80. Man, E.Barth, John A.Elliott & Mark W. Fin, Vtarket Rewards Associated with Patterns of
Increasing Earn/ings,37 J.AccT.REs. 387,398, 412 (1999) (showing that firms with patterns
of higher eainings have higher price per eamings ratios, after controlling for other

factors).
81. For a detailed description of quarter to quarter earngs pressures in the late 1990s, see

Joseph Fuller & Michael C.Jensen, just Say No to Wall Street (Feb.2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssn.com/abstract-297156.
82. A ten percent decline based on a one cent shortfall can be explained as rational. if stock
traders are skeptical about eainings figures and assume that management accounts
aggressively, then the one cent shortfall signals that management's cookie jars have run
out and all other aggressive gimmicks have been used to the maximum. Given this read,
the one cent shortfall signals veiy bad news. Management, moreover, has no choice but to
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Shareholder responses to these justifications depend on the state of the
market and the makeup of the particular shareholder.
We begin on the investment side. The fundamental value investor will not
favor the manipulation of earnings figures through loss reserves. Since this
investor only cares about cash flows in the future, it wants an unvarnished
present report. Management advocacy that results in smoother numbers
makes it harder to work through to the most accurate valuation. Since greater
volatility means a higher discount factor, the appraiser needs accurate
information about volatility so as to make the adjustment.
The profiles of long-term and smart-money investors will differ. The
long-term investor, once situated in a stock, presumably will not be
destabilized when management turns up a couple of cents short of
expectations in the current quarter. At the same time, earnings management,
pursued in moderation, will not inflict any significant injury on this investor.
In the long run, the empirical cash flow absolutely controls, and the long-run
question is whether the company produces competitively. Therefore, the
long-term investor could profess indifference to earnings management keyed
to the short-term interest. The profile alters as accounting manipulation
becomes more aggressive and holds out a risk of ew post enforcement. An
accounting scandal means deadweight costs of defense and accompanying
institutional instability. All of these impair long-term value. Better to submit
accurate reports in the first place.
The smart money is supposed to be able to see through the ruse to the
periodic cash flows, at least so long as the published reports give it an
adequate basis for so doing. It incurs the cost of the analysis, but, since it is
smart, it will be doing the analysis in any event. For example, from a smart
money point of view, there arguably would have been nothing wrong with the
Enron Corporation's practice of pumping up its earnings numbers with
results from sham transactions with special purpose entities, so long as Enron
83
fully disclosed the transactions in the footnotes to its financials.
Enforcement costs remain a negative, but the smart money, by definition,
gets out first.
Now let us consider the speculators. Assume a shareholder buys a stock
on a trend-chasing basis. The trend is that earnings are rising. The holding
period is short or intermediate, without a definite termination date. Given this
profile, an earnings shortfall hyped as bad news could be destabilizing,
causing this shareholder to sell and incur tax and transaction costs. It follows

83.

For a description of the Unron fraud, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275, 1314 22 (2002).
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that a little finagling to avoid the firm being short on its earnings projections
will not be objectionable. Just by arranging the numbers, management
protects a shareholder from herself and from the manic nature of the market.
Unfortunately, earnings management also holds out problems for
speculators, even as they are its nominal beneficiaries. It works well only so
long as management massages the numbers to protect an upward trend that
responds by staying on trajectory for at least the intermediate term. Let us
suppose that the upward trend stalls, causing management to draw down
from the cookie jar to protect the slope of the line. There will be some
shareholders who are influenced to hold who might otherwise have sold
because of the stall. As to these, the income- smoothing may or may not be
beneficial. It will certainly turn out to be detrimental if events make clear that
the upward trend was history as of the time of the income-smoothing. Once
the trend turns down, the manipulation undertaken protectively turns out to
be injurious. Indeed, all speculative investors' interests then presumptively lie
in getting out in the first wave. Where the unvarnished truth prompts that
sale, income- smoothing injures the holder. The injury is even worse for the
holder buying in reliance on the manipulated numbers at or after the turning
point in the trend.
With earnings management, then, the speculative investor to which
management caters could turn out to be an injured party.
Standard stock option plans do nothing to skew management's
incentives to a long-term, fundamental value view of financial reporting.
Managers who massage numbers protect a trend into which they can sell
stock purchased through option exercise, pocketing a premium over
fundamental value. They do so as the smartest of smart money, for they
control the reports. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong show this in a formal
model in which, given large differences of opinion about the value of the
stock, even a contract that optimally trades off risk-sharing and management
incentives will induce a short-term orientation and encourage actions that
84
feed speculation.
Presumably, smart-money shareholders of managers thus incentivized,
whether noise traders or value investors, will be closely watching the
managers' selling activity so as to benefit along with them. These holders can
protect themselves. A sharper conflict of interest opens up between managers
employing aggressive
accounting
and noise-trading,
dumb-money
85
stock.
the
to
on
hold
and
trend
on
the
shareholders who rely
84.
85.

Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 11, at 6.
Note also an additional conflict between management and the dumb money interest.
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Speculative shareholders acted out this volatile behavior pattern in the
real world over the last decade. In the standard account of the recent
corporate reporting crisis, managers in the late 1990s, incentivized by stock
options, used consulting rents to induce auditors to accord a free hand to
manage bottom-line numbers. Auditors defended the practice by reference to
the shareholder interest: if the threat to independence did not upset the
shareholders, then regulators should not intervene to impose their more
conservative views about accounting choices.8 , At the time, the supply-anddemand dynamic respecting audit services operated to make auditors sensitive
to the speculative shareholder interest. Unfortunately for the auditors, stock
market reverses later caused the speculators to take a fundamental value view
of financial reporting, condemning accounting formerly viewed with favor or
indifference. The experience of Enron, WorldCom, and other scandals
ameliorated the incentive problem respecting financial reports by prompting a
shift in the way investors view the numbers.
The recent shift in shareholder demand respecting reporting does not
solve the incentive problem, however. The same shift in demand occurred
after 1929, with conservatism prevailing long thereafter. But speculative
demands for aggression eventually returned during the bull markets of the
1960s and early 1970s. A similar, cyclical return to the speculative perspective
on financial reporting thus can be predicted to occur at some point in the
future. When the time comes, unrestricted management stockholdings will
hasten the transition.
There again arises a powerful case for retention constraints. A long-term
restraint on alienation ties management's interest to long-term cash flows
rather than constructed numbers in present reports. Here again the need for
constraint is reduced in undervalued firms, whose managers only want to get
the markets to see the truth. But a clear distinction cannot be made in practice
between overvalued and undervalued firms-no one ever knows for certain

Prior to the change of the accounting rules in 2005, stock option compensation did not
entail a charge to periodic earnings. See ACCOUNIING F-OR STOcK BASED COMP.,

Statement of in. Accounting Standards No. 123 (in. Accounting Standards Bd. 1995).
Thus could management compensate itself without reporting the arrangement's economic
cost to existing shareholders. Of course, smart money shareholders, whether speculators
or investors, were not fooled. Dumb money presumably would have taken the earnings
reports at face value.
86. RICK ANILL, P.A. GRItu-EN, DAVID J. TEECE & OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, An Economic
Analysis of Auditor Independence for a Multi Client, Multi Service Public Accounting Firm (Report
for A1CPA,

1997),

available at http://ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/members/div

/secps/isb/0117194.doc. The industrv's advocates also pointed to informational
advantages and the adequacy of legal liability constraints.
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which firm is which. Indeed, if the manager of an overvalued firm believes
the firm to be undervalued, an incentive to overstate results could follow.
Strict retention rules again are signaled across the board.
D. Payout Policy
Hypothesize a firm with free cash flow. Management has a choice as to
how to disgorge the money. It can raise the regular dividend (or declare a
special dividend), or it can cause the firm to repurchase its shares in the open
market. If the EMH were true and the choice had no tax consequences, the
shareholders would be indifferent regarding the choices In the real world,
however, the choice has tax implications. In addition, the real world holds out
the complicating possibility that stock may be overpriced or underpriced at
the time of the repurchase.
Different shareholders will have a different view of the choice. Longterm taxpaying holders who view the stock as correctly priced or underpriced
will favor repurchase. Even under the regime of rate parity between ordinary
income and capital gains introduced by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, 88 repurchase holds out the benefit of a tax
deferral for long-term holders. 9 Short-term and noise-trading holders need
not disagree. Repurchase announcements are taken as good news and tend to
trigger a three percent announcement period gain."' They thus can figure into
the stock's momentum. Disagreement breaks out only if the stock is
overpriced at the time of repurchase. Here, repurchase programs disadvantage
long-term, fundamental value investors, particularly if they are not smart
enough to see the temporary overvaluation. A noise trader who overcredits
the signal might be similarly disadvantaged.
Meanwhile, standard stock options skew management's choice away from
dividends and toward repurchases in all states of the world. Consider the
choice between a dividend and a repurchase from an option holder's point of
view. Dividends are paid to shareholders but not to option holders. One
dollar paid out as a dividend does an option holder no good unless the option
is dividend-protected, i.e., unless the option contract provides for a
87.

This follows from the irrelevance hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller. See lranco

Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theog' of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
88. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108 27, 117 Stat.
752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 46 U.S.C.).

89. William W.Bratton, The Nenw Dividend Puzzle, 93 GO. L. J. 845, 852 55 (2005).
90. Id. at 863.
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diminution of the exercise price to make up for the dividend. But only 1
percent of executives have dividend-protected stock options. 91 It follows that
stock option value is negatively related to the firm's expected dividend
payout. Assume a manager with a ten-year option. Further assume that the
firm's stock price has a volatility of thirty percent, and that the risk-free rate
of return is five percent. Under the Black-Scholes option pricing model, a cut
in the dividend yield from two percent to one percent increases the option's
value by 18 percent. Cutting the dividend entirely raises option value by
92
thirty-nine percent.
Stock options, then, raise the financial stakes of the choice between
dividends and repurchases, giving managers a strong incentive to prefer
repurchases. Unsurprisingly, empirical studies show a strong correlation
between stock options and payout choices. The probability of stock
repurchase is positively related to the presence of stock options. 93 Firms with
94
large stock option plans are more likely to announce share repurchase plans.
Dividends are strongly negatively correlated with options. 95 A study of the
largest S&P 500 firms from 1994 to 1997 shows that even as the repurchase
payout rose from seventeen percent to fourty-one percent as a percentage of
income, the dividend yield dropped steadily from 2.76 percent to 1.41
percent.96
In addition, the number of shares repurchased in open-market repurchase
9
programs relate positively to the total numbers of options exercisable.
Some studies report that firms repurchase gradually over the lives of options
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK (- LABOR ECON. 2485, 2509
10 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., Elsevier B.V. 1st ed. 1999).
92. Scott J. Weisbenner, Corporate Share Repurchases in the 1990s: What Role Do Stock Options
Play? 9 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper No. 2000-29, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200029/200029pap.pdf
93. Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation 15 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
91.

Research, Working Paper No. 6467, 1998), availableathttp://www.nber.org

/papers/w6467.
94. Mar E. Barth & Ron Kasznik, Share Repurchases and IntangibleAssets, 28 J. Accu'. & ECON.
211,238 (1999).

95. See George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, CorporatePa'outPolic ' and WanagerialStock Incentives, 60
J FIN. ECON. 45, 47 48 (2001) (using the Lambert model to show that a one percent
standard deviation change in the stock option variable reduces dividends by thirty eight
basis points).
96. Nellie Liang & Steven A. Sharpe, Share Repurchases and Emp/o9ee Stock Options and Their
Inplicationsfor S&P 500 Share Retirements and Expected Returns 17 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working
Paper No. 1999 59, 1999), availabe at http://www.federaleserve.gov/pubs/feds
/1999/199959/199959pap.pdf
97. Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn't a Buyback: Open 1arket Repurchases and Employee
Options, 63J. FIN. ECON. 235, 238 (2002).
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to reduce the options' dilutive effect.9" But there also is evidence that firms
time repurchase announcements around the times stock options are being
exercised. 99 Whatever the timing, the numbers are large. One survey finds
that firms repurchase roughly thirty-eight percent of the shares underlying
their option grants prior to exercise." The more stock options outstanding,
the more stock the firms repurchase. Managers admit this. Three-fifths of the
executives reporting in one survey acknowledged that they instituted an open
market repurchase program to prepare for stock option exercise. 1()
The situation can be corrected in part. Interpolating dividend protection
in option plans removes the incentive-skew toward repurchases. Of course,
given a dividend-paying firm, dividend protection increases the value of the
options; the giveback would be a decrease in the number granted or an
increase in the exercise price. But, even given dividend protection,
management may retain the urge to warehouse in advance of exercise,
particularly in light of the new rules requiring that the option's cost must be
deducted from periodic earnings. Now that options cause earnings to be
lower, there appears to be more reason than ever to reduce the number of
shares outstanding so that the earnings-per- share figure, so critical in the eye
of the noise traders, stays as high as possible.
E. Bonuses and Exit Payments
Stock option plans, whatever the shortcomings in their design, have one
great merit. They condition rewards on the stock price, which in turn is
determined by free-market actors. Firms also dispense large cash bonuses.
These could be tied to the stock price, but tend not to be. This section looks
first into periodic performance bonuses and then into bonuses paid on exit.
1.

Performance Bonuses

Many cash bonus plans employ periodic earnings targets. This practice
returns us to incentives respecting financial reports. Accounting standards
give management room to manipulate numbers to magnify current results.
98.
99.

Weisbenner, supra note 92, at 3.
Konan Chan, David lkenberr & lnmoo Lee, Do Firss Knowingl Repurchase Stock for Good

Reason? 2 n4 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www.rufrice.edu
/-jgspaper/
Wlkenberryinsiderv6.pdf.

100. Weisbenner, supra note 92, at 23.
101. Id. at 8 (citing a 1999 survey of 1600 CFOs).
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Conditioning bonuses on earnings encourages this, with possible benefits for
short-term holders and noise traders, at least where the earnings reports cause
the stock to be overvalued. On the other hand, to the extent that smart
money investors determine the market price and the stock is valued correctly,
earnings ruses do not hold out stock price benefits. But the perverse incentive
remains: the cash bonus scheme still rewards management for putting
numbers on a page, without spillover benefits to shareholders of any type.
Other periodic cash bonus awards are tied to particular performance
targets. To the extent the targets are tied to the improvement of bottom-line
performance, these bonuses may be unobjectionable. Indeed, in the case of a
firm with undervalued stock, they may be an effective means to provide
periodic rewards to effective managers pending the stock's recovery. In
addition, these bonuses can be tailored to the performance of particular tasks.
Unfortunately, however, the practice often falls short. Some performance
targets lack a strong connection to the improvement of bottom-line
performance. Consider one common target-spending all the funds in an
annual budget.0 2 This has the benefit of being cash-flow based and thus less
subject to manipulation than an earnings target. On the other hand, it holds
out a bonus for the act of investment rather than for the longer process of
investing successfully and realizing projected returns.0 3 Compare a bonus
paid for closing an acquisition.0 4 As with the budget bonus, the target's
accomplishment lies within the discretion of the executive payee, and the
bonus is paid for the act of investing, rather than the result of investing
successfully.1 5 Recent results have been particularly dismaying. Despite stock
option compensation, the period 1998-2001 was the worst in history with
respect to acquirer losses due to bad mergers.0 6 In these cases, a unified
model of the shareholder suffices to condemn the practice; no shareholder
interest is advanced.
The criticisms trigger a question. If accounting numbers fall short as a
performance metric, and the stock price suffices only on a long-term basis, is

102. See JA\LS F. RADA, COMPLNSATIION CONIMITi LL HANDBOOK 115 16 (2002).

103. Unfortunately, these budget based bonus plans tend to open doors for manipulation. B%
setting thresholds and caps, they encourage smoothing and manipulation of the capital
budgeting process. See Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 69 75, which recommends
a linear approach that is not keyed to any particular year's capital budget.
104. in addition, when performance targets are not met, the often are lowered ex post.
BEBCI UK & IRIED, sopranote 5, at 124-27.

105. Id.
106. See Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & Rene M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction on A
Massive Scale? A Study' ofAcquiring Firm Returns in the Recent fer Wave, 60 J lIN 757, 758,
770 (2005).
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there any reliable bonus metric available from quarter to quarter? Critics of
the prevailing practice point to cash flow as an alternative metric. Private
equity firms use cash flows to reward the managers of leveraged-buyout firms,
triggering bonuses on the generation of cash flows sufficient to service
debt.'" I 08 Other firms reward managers when cash flows exceed the cost of

capital. 1

Consider, as a possible variation on this theme, the dividend. Oliver Hart
shows that in an ideal (and taxless) world, first-best results easily can be
achieved with an all-common- stock capital structure and a simple incentive
compensation system. Hart describes a simple two-period situation where the
firm is founded at t = 0 and liquidated at t = 2, with an intermediate decision
respecting liquidation or continuance to be made at t = 1, along with a
dividend payment. Hart would make the compensation of the manager
depend entirely on the dividend d. That is, incentive compensation I should
equal 11 (dl + d2), where B is a proportion of the firm's total returns. If the
payment also covers liquidation proceeds, where I = 11 [d + (d2, L)], the
manager can be expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation
at t = 1. If the expected value of L at t = 1 is greater than the total returns
expected at t = 2, the firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no costly contracting
designed to align the manager's incentives with those of outside investors is
necessary.1 ' 9 The problem, in Hart's conception, is that the bribe 11 required
to align management incentives with those of outside security holders is
unfeasibly large."() Accordingly, a complex capital structure must be devised
in order to align incentives in the direction of optimal investment and insure
that the actor with the appropriate incentives controls the assets.
In theory, then, the dividend cannot feasibly serve as the exclusive basis
for measuring executive pay. But might it serve a limited purpose as a metric
for periodic cash bonuses? Unlike accounting numbers such as periodic
107. SeeJensen & Murphy, supra note 2, at 76.
108. Id.at 76 77.
109. OLIVER

HARI, 1FIRMS, CONtA(CIS, AND

["INANCIAL SIRUCIURE 146 48 (Clarendon Press

1995); see
also Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, Robust FinancialContracting and the Role of
Venture Capitalists, 49 J. lIN. 371 (1994) (articulating a fixed fraction model of venture
capitalist participation in the decision of whether to continue). in the model, there is no ex
ante prospect of firm continuance in the event of poor results; in the real world, managers
do derive private benefits from asset management and might opt to continue.

110. The large 11is conceded in venture capital financings and private equity restructurings.
But the context is different from that of the pay debate. \enture capital and private equity
both involve arm's length negotiations with outside equity capital that exercises control,

and transaction structures share a limited duration. The pay debate concerns mature
publicly traded firms, with their separation of ownership and control, and an implicit,

unlimited time horizon.
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earnings, the dividend follows from actual operations and cash flows. Unlike
the stock price, it is not the product of valuation under uncertainty. A
dividend-based bonus scheme would encourage firms to pay dividends,
alleviating problems of overinvestment and excess reliance on open market
stock repurchases. The question is whether a dividend-contingent bonus
would cause the opposite problem, underinvestment. Dividends, like bonuses
contingent on acquisition closings, follow from actions within the zone of
management discretion. Managers seeking larger bonuses could divert cash
flows needed to finance good projects into dividend flows. But there could be
countervailing incentives. Managers holding stock options subject to retention
constraints would retain an incentive to make good long-term investments.
Given such a long-term incentive alignment, a dividend-based bonus might
have the limited effect of causing the managers to raise one notch the hurdle
rate applied in evaluating investments, which need not be a bad thing. The
matter would come down to the amount of the dividend-based bonus: it
should import an incentive toward objective evaluation of new investments,
without skewing hurdle rates to destructive, uneconomically high levels.
That said, a dividend-based bonus suits only mature firms with steady
cash flows. For a contrast, hypothesize a firm at an early growth stage of its
life cycle with an investment set that holds out excellent returns for the
indefinite future. Further hypothesize that the firm seriously pursues an
incentive-compatible, long-term equity compensation scheme. Stock
purchases through option exercises are locked down so that executives at all
times have a material portion of their wealth tied to the long-term
performance of the firm's stock. Regular salaries are capped at $1 million per
year in light of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m). 112 Finally, cash
bonuses are paid only in tandem with dividend announcements, with the
payment mechanism designed so that no perverse incentives arise respecting
investment policy. The scenario implies a problem: as of t = 0, the top team
has to wait for the long term to come about before receiving big payoffs. The
long wait fails to synchronize with tournament economics. As of t = 0, any
potential manager with bargaining power will reject the terms of the
compensation plan. At t = 1, an impatient manager might look for a job

112. internal Revenue Code
162(m) (2005), enacted in 1994, limits the deductibility of
straight salaries to $1 million; compensation bey ond $1 million is not deductible unless
conditioned on a link to performance.
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elsewhere. This firm, then, will be thrown back to more problematic bonus
calculations.
2.

Exit Payments

Firms also pay bonuses on entry and exit. Bonuses for signing are
unsurprising, assuming a competitive market for the best managers. Bonuses
for leaving, whether by firing, retirement, or acquisition, are more
disturbing, 113 competitive market or not. The average severance package
equals three or more years of compensation, with only two percent of firms
reducing it in the event the CEO finds new work. The critics argue that firing
1 14
should not be a cash bonanza.
Exit payments still can be defended in theory. Long-term value creation
follows from long-term investment under uncertainty. A payment that
cushions failure arguably encourages risk-taking, for whatever the reputational
consequences of forced exit, the executive does not have to worry about
personal cash flow. This argument resonates especially well with respect to
undervalued firms whose executives might be unjustly blamed for a
languishing stock price. It also comes to bear in defense of golden parachutes
triggered by acquisitions, as the bonus encourages a neutral posture with
1 15
respect to sale of the company.
Questions still arise, however. The golden parachute makes sense because
exit coincides with a premium payment to the other shareholders more easily
secured with the executive's cooperation. Other terminations, whether for
retirement or incompetence, do not coincide with such upside events. If these
exiting executives already are the beneficiaries of supersize pay packages, cash
flow should not be a near-term problem. In addition, the exit payment, by
insuring against failure even as the executive is richly compensated at present,
could diminish incentives to succeed. The tournament incentive obtains only
for those trying to reach the top team. For the winners, continued highpowered incentives depend on the post-tournament compensation package.
Of course, reputational incentives motivate executives whatever their pay
arrangements. But recent decades' experience counsels against reliance on
reputation. If reputation mattered greatly, firms presumably would revert to
the practice of three decades ago and remit the lion's share of compensation
in the form of straight salary, saving the shareholders the dilution costs of

113. BEBCIIUK& IRIED,

supranote 5, at 88

114. Id.at 132 35.
115. See REDA, supra note 69, at 231 32.

89.
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supersize equity compensation. The system abandoned reliance on reputation
a decade and a half ago when it shifted its focus to high-powered incentives.
Whatever the system's present shortcomings, turning back is not a plausible
option.

F. Summary
This part began with two questions. First, what kind of managershareholders are prevailing incentive compensation practices likely to
produce? Second, does the shareholder interest provide a coherent normative
yardstick with which to evaluate prevailing practices?
The answer to the first question depends on the case. With an
undervalued firm, the managers are likely to resemble long-term, fundamental
value shareholders. With an overvalued firm, present practice aligns their
interest with short-term noise traders, making it rational for managers to
make suboptimal investments, distort financial reports, and follow suboptimal
payout practices. The informational advantage that comes with the managers'
inside positions exacerbates the problem.
The answer to the second question is yes and no. Sometimes, as with
some bonus payments, the shareholder interest answers normative questions
with a unitary voice. But responses often depend on the shareholders' type,
the state of the market, and the undervaluation or overvaluation of the
particular firm's stock. The noisier the stock market and the more overvalued
the firm's stock, the less coherent the signal from the shareholder interest.
The shareholder interest will more likely be united, and management's
incentives will more likely be well aligned with it when the firm's stock is
undervalued. Undervalued firms attract the fundamental value interest; noise
traders stay away.
But suppose that managers of all firms are prone to believe that the
market undervalues their stock? One often enough hears managers
complaining that the market underappreciates their firms' stock. If
widespread belief in undervaluation is the case, it helps explain the laxity in
prevailing practice, for conventional plans make more economic sense
assuming undervalued stock. But the incentive problem is simultaneously
aggravated. Some managers may believe their stock to be underappreciated
when the stock in fact is overvalued. Managers of other overvalued firms may
accurately appraise the situation. Either way, incentive pay schemes invite
suboptimal investment, inaccurate financial reports, and skewed payout
policy.
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III. THE VOLATILE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST AND
THE DEBATE OVER SUPERSIZE PAY

The debate over executive compensation focuses on the quality of the
bargaining space in which corporate boards and top team members effect
trade-offs between incentives and compensation.
The leading critics, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, charge that
compensation practices fail to satisfy the validation standard of an arm'slength contract. Managers, they say, possess and effectively wield power,
assuring that compensation prevails over incentives and that performance
rewards come on easy terms. 116 Bebchuk and Fried make a short, direct
prescription, reasoning as follows: given that (a) the victims of the imbalanced
arrangement are the shareholders and (b) the injury is due to management
empowerment, it follows that (c) the only plausible cure lies in empowering
11
the shareholders.
Those who view the governance system more favorably offer three
defenses of pay practices. First, the same phenomena that the critics ascribe
to executive empowerment can be better explained in terms of the economic
relationship between risk and return, as higher risks attending equity-based
pay must be compensated with higher upside payouts. Second, to the extent
the practice falls short of the arm's-length ideal, informational shortcomings
are responsible. Boards incorrectly believe that stock options are a bargain
mode of compensation and tend to overvalue them in comparison to cash
payments. Third, whatever the shortcomings of the practice, the system is
fundamentally sound. Managers have on the whole done well for the
shareholders since shifting to performance pay in the early 1990s. Loud
attacks only enhance the political credibility of the outsider social critics,
whose calls for social justice will only crimp the incentive system.
This part reviews this debate against the background of volatile
shareholder behavior. It shows that less ground separates the various
positions than first appears. Both sides agree that incentive compatibility must
be traded off against present compensation. They thus together hold open a
door for the perverse effects of speculative shareholding.

116. BEBCIIUK& FRIED, supra note 5, at 4 5, 61 117

117. Id. at 10 12, 189 216.
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A. Power and Rents
Bebchuk and Fried's normative base point is a model of arm's-length
bargaining. Under the model, executive pay packages should reward an
executive with a sum in excess of his or her reservation price; should contain
terms that encourage the executive to increase the value of the firm; and
should avoid terms that reduce the value of the firm. 118 More particularly,
"arm's length" means modifying existing arrangements to add more upside
pull. Stock options should be priced out-of-the-money at grant and the price
should be indexed so as to filter out market-wide advancesi19 Reloading and
backdoor repricing should be prohibited.1 20 Retention constraints should be
imposed.1 21
Bonus triggers should be performance-sensitive, and exit
payments should be curtailed.122

1.

The Arm's-Length Bargain

Compensation packages, say Bebchuk and Fried, do not conform to the
arm's-length model because managers influence independent directors.
Restating the point, managers use power to extract rents, defined as benefits
better than those available under an arm's-length bargain. 123 A prediction
follows: the more power a manager possesses, the greater the rents in the pay
package.1 24 Power, of course, cannot be observed and quantified directly,
forcing Bebchuk and Fried to back their positive assertion with inferences
drawn from institutional arrangements. They point out that corporate
institutions are ill-suited to foster arm's-length bargaining between top
managers and their corporate employers, drawing on a list of shortcomings
well known to students of corporate governance.125
118. Id. at 18 19. Jensen and Murphy describe a similar base point, noting that the firm faces a
trade off with respect to the amount of pay conceded and the hiring of better motivated
employees. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 20 21.
119. BEBCIIUK & IRIED, supzra note 5, at 137 46, 159 62.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 164-70.
Id. at 174 85.
Id. at 121 36.
Id. at 5.
Id.
at 63.
More particularly, outside directors tend to be loyal to or dominated by the CEO due to
process infirmities such as large numbers, C1E0 chairmanship, interlocks, and financial
dependence. Id. at 80 82. in addition, most firms lack a substantial outside shareholder,
the financial interest of whom would influence bargaining over pay. Id. at 82 83.
Oversight by large institutional shareholders ameliorates the problem, but tends to be
sporadic across firms. Id. at 83.
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Bebchuk and Fried's assertions about power, rents, and the boardroom
bargaining context all follow from a basic assumption concerning the
appropriate trade-off between incentives and compensation: an arm's-length
deal, they assert, would tightly tie pay to performance. At first this seems
surprising; one somehow expects a firmer foundation than an intuitive
association of hurdle height and value creation. But, on reflection, Bebchuk
and Fried have no basis for proceeding other than by raw assertion. After all,
we have no robust positive theory of optimal incentive compensation. The
absence of a theory also explains why process infirmities figure so
prominently in Bebchuk and Fried's substantive case, for if managers possess
a bargaining advantage and intrinsically prefer more compensation and less
incentive compatibility, then the resulting contract will reflect their
preference. Given Bebchuk and Fried's assumption respecting the appropriate
trade-off, the contract is ipsofacto substantively infirm.
Bebchuk and Fried bump up against the problem of trading off
incentives and compensation at two critical points in their analysis. The issue
arises when they propose stricter terms for option plans, like out-of-themoney pricing and indexing. Both of these increase the option price and thus
decrease the value of each option granted. They propose a reciprocal
adjustment: the number of options granted can be increased to adjust for the
price increase so that the present value of the grant (and thus the
compensation) remains unchanged.1 26
Here, in effect, incentives and
compensation synchronize perfectly so that the firm's value can be increased
due to intensified management effort without management having to give up
even a single dollar of compensation value. Although the managers may end
up working harder in exchange for the same overall compensation value, the
harder work is rewarded with a bigger upside payoff.
The trade-off problem also arises with respect to retention constraints.
All other things being equal, a tighter restraint on alienation decreases the pay
plan's compensation value by blocking the executive's access to liquidity and
portfolio diversification. But here, Bebchuk and Fried propose no Paretooptimal swap. Instead, they see a pie to be sliced. An "efficient" contract, they
say, slices carefully, striking a balance between the competing interests with
staged holding periods that would vary from case to case. 127 A question
arises: Why not gross up again in this case, compensating the executive with a
larger number of inalienable shares so as to make up for the loss in value to

126. Id. at 140 43.
127. Id. at 174 76.
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the alienation restraint? Bebchuk and Fried appear to intuit a limit to
usefulness of tit-for-tat trades of compensation for incentives.
The differential treatment is puzzling, given the strong commonalities in
the two cases. In both, present value would be increased in exchange for
incentive compatibility. The difference is that in the first case, the gross-up
pays for forward motion in the stock price, while in the second case, it guards
against perverse effects. Perhaps the benefits of forward motion justify
increased compensation because the firm is projected to be more valuable net
of the trade, where downside-avoided costs of misalignment with the
speculative shareholder interest are more difficult to confront and gauge.
Note that such a judgment is more likely to follow if the shareholder is
modeled in a unitary and benign mold.
Other factors also may be at work. Perhaps the problem identified by
Hart creeps into the option compensation scenario at some point: full
incentive compatibility may just cost too much in terms of the percentage
interest in the firm conceded. But trade-offs made in practice probably follow
from a very different intuition. Corporate actors may perceive a small-scale
trade-off or no trade-off at all because they perceive the management interest
at stake in the case of retention constraints to be more legitimate than that
implicated in a negotiation over price. In this view, diversification and
liquidity are to shareholding what freedom of movement is to citizenship, and
only a limited concession can reasonably be expected at the bargaining table.
So limited is the concession demanded that the question of countervailing
compensation never arises. Significantly, this approach also tends to imply a
unitary and benign model of the shareholder.
A contrasting approach to the trade-off should be put on the table for
consideration. Under this, the firm "just says no" to short-term liquidity and
diversification because proper incentive alignment should not be negotiable.
To remit the matter of a long-term time horizon to the black box of arm'slength contracting leaves open the possibility of perverse effects. Even
assuming an arm's-length bargaining context, the more bargaining power
brought to the table by the executive, the more the incentives are skewed
toward the speculative shareholder model. Executive pay plans have two
purposes: to compensate and to incentivize. If, in the context of a package
that mixes straight salary, cash bonuses, and equity awards, it is the incentive
purpose that justifies the equity-based component, then it is unclear why
retention constraints automatically must be countered by significant
concessions to the compensation objective.
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Shareholder Empowerment

The skew toward the speculative interest persists when Bebchuk and
Fried set out a menu of governance improvements. Some of the items on the
list would tweak the present system so as to make it more likely that the
shareholder voice registers inside boardrooms. For example, transparency
could be enhanced. All compensation could be reported with a dollar value
attached, and executive stock sales could be directly reported by the
company28
In addition, the shareholder vote could be made more
meaningful, with separate votes on different segments of compensation plans
129
giving shareholders the opportunity to pinpoint objectionable provisions.
Other proposals on the menu are more radical and would empower the
shareholders, fundamentally changing the system. For example, binding
shareholder initiatives on compensation could be permitted.13
More than
that, the board could lose its legally vested control of the agenda over
important corporate legislation so that shareholders could remove
entrenching provisions. 131 Finally, shareholders could have access to the
ballot on terms broader than those recently proposed by the Securities and
1 32

Exchange Commission.

As the proposals become more radical, volatile shareholder behavior
becomes more of a problem, or at least holds out no circumstantial guarantee
of a solution. To see why, consider the counterfactual possibility of a decade
in all respects like the 1990s, except that Bebchuk and Fried's shareholder
access reforms are in place. The question is whether the shareholder voice
rises up to insist on reforms assuring that compensation packages hold out no
perverse effects respecting investments, financial reports, and payout policy.
The scenario is highly unlikely. Shareholders at the time, including the
institutional investors on which access schemes rely, were happy to ride
market momentum. It took a bear market and scandals to trigger shareholder
demands about bad mergers and the quality of financial reports. At the same
time, on some compensation issues, shareholders probably have unified and
128. Id. at 192 94. The Securities and Exchange Commission, apparently influenced by all the
criticism, has proposed new rules requiring more extensive disclosures of executive

compensation arrangements. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Executive
Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Release Nos. 33 8655, 34 53185, 71 F.R.
6541 (Feb. 8, 2006).

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 211 12.
Id. at 210. For an extended discussion, see Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
ShareholderPower, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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unproblematic interests. Out-of-the-money pricing and indexing stand out as
possibilities. As to these matters, which go purely to the issue of "bang for
the buck," shareholder access might have a consistently beneficial effect.
Meanwhile, the access cure holds out minuses as well as plusses.

B. Defensive Tactics
Defenders of the practice respond to the critics at three levels. The first
level presents a full-dress defense of the prevailing practice. The second level
steps back to admit process infirmities, but to reject the unequal bargaining
power description. The third level steps farther back still to admit
management empowerment but to argue that the system is robust
nonetheless.
1.

The Fair Deal

The full-dress defense, put forward by Professor Murphy and others,
draws on the economic relationship between risk and return to describe
prevailing compensation practice as a fair trade. 133 This analysis turns on
comparison of outside and insider option valuation. From the firm's point of
view, the cost of an executive stock option is the cash consideration the firm
would receive from a third party investor for the same contingent interest in
the stock. But third-party investors and firm employees differ in a critical
respect as option buyers. Third-party investors are fully diversified and
positioned to hedge the risk attending the option position. 134
They
accordingly are risk-neutral, where employees are underdiversified and riskaverse. It follows that the option's value to the employee is less than its value
to the third party. 135 It further follows that an option makes no sense when
considered as pure compensation in comparison to cash: in order to
constitute $1 of pay in the eyes of the employee, option compensation must
be increased to make up for the employee's valuation discount. The option
thereby costs the firm more than the $1 in value the employee receives. An
option nevertheless might make sense as incentive compensation. 136 But the

133. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversfled Executives (Harvard
NOM Research Paper No. 00 05, Nov. 2001), availableathttp://ssn.com/abstract252805 [hereinafter Hall & Murphy 20021.
134. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Co-,pensation: VanageeialPower Versus the Perceived Cost
of Stock Options, 69 U. Ciii. L. REv. 847, 859 60 (2002) [hereinafter Mu-phy 2002 .
135. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 38.

136. To expand upon the claim of inefficient use of stock options, Murphy looks to grants to
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overall terms of an arm's-length option package should be expected to reflect
the employee's risk aversion. This explains terms that otherwise could be seen
as giveaways, such as exercise prices set at-the-money rather than at a
discount, the failure to index the exercise price, 137 and the allowance of both
early exercise 138 and stock sales after exercise.39
This fair deal emerges only on a critical assumption-that the employee's
compensation objective and the firm's incentive objective may be traded off
without any further scrutiny of the resulting contract's incentive properties.
This contrasts sharply with Bebchuk and Fried's assumption that an arm'slength deal tightly ties pay to performance and avoids harm to the firm. It also
leads to a strange result when viewed through the lens of this Article's
typology of shareholding. In the fair deal story, the executive bargains to
attain the status of a fully diversified outside shareholder with full exit rights.
The bargained-for status invites the executive to take the speculative mindset,
much like an aggressive mutual fund. The question asked above comes up
again: Why should a bargaining zone holding out that result be deemed
normatively acceptable?
Substantive scrutiny of incentive effects cannot be avoided under the fairdeal story's own basic assumptions. The trade-offs that make the deal fair
follow from the assumption that stock options, viewed solely as
compensation, amount to an intrinsically inefficient form of compensation. It
follows that option compensation can only be justified based on the
incentives it creates.
A justificatory standard can be set loosely or strictly. The relaxed standard
takes a Kaldor-Hicks approach, i.e., the value of the incentives created must
employees outside of the top team, noting that in 2002, ninety percent of options granted
went to employees below the management level. Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at
16. The efficiency objection implicates the tournament justification. Since options are
worth less to employees than their opportunity cost to the firm, option compensation
makes sense only when it provides the best available means to import high powered
incentives. This is not the case with subordinate employees; for them, the firm's internal
advancement tournament and the prospect of equity compensation in the event of a
tournament victory already provide incentives. in addition, within the general employee
population, it is impossible to tell whose effort improves the stock price, inviting free
riding among the beneficiaries of an equity based reward system. Id. at 16 17.
137. Hall & Murphy 2002, supra note 133, at 3.
138. Id.
at 13.
139. John 1. Core, Wayne Guay, and David F. Larcker point out that if the executive already
holds the firm's stock at the time of the option grant and is allowed to sell on a one to
one basis as options are exercised, the executive will place the same value on the option as
a third party investor. See John Core et al., Executive Equit Compensation and Incentives: A
Sunrv, 30 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract276425.
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exceed the options' opportunity cost as compensation and the costs of
perverse effects. This allows incentive incompatibility to be traded for
compensation so long as the overall result makes the firm more valuable. Real
world trade-offs could only be evaluated by intuition, of course; here, as with
any other exercise in valuation, present verification is not a possibility. The
strict standard takes the "just say no" approach mooted above and aspires to
a Pareto-optimal result, in which the value of the incentives created must
exceed the options' opportunity cost, and the scheme may allow no
foreseeable perverse effects. This standard's benefit lies in the imposition of
retention constraints on a per se basis. Bargaining and unverifiable cost-benefit
trade-offs proceed in respect of the other elements of the deal. Assuming an
arm's-length context, the executive with bargaining power gets a gross-up in
the number of shares granted; the executive with fewer chips at the table
comes away with reduced compensation value.

2.

The Free Lunch Fallacy

Now we turn to a process defense mooted to counter the charge of
executive empowerment. This begins with the same assertion as the fair deal
defense: stock options, viewed as compensation, fail to pass the cost-benefit
test. The follow-up assertion is that board members fail to appreciate the
costs. They incorrectly believe stock options to be a bargain mode of
compensation and overvalue options in comparison to cash payments by
underestimating the options' economic cost to the shareholders whose stakes
they dilute.140
Jensen and Murphy use this point to account for a number of practices.
For example, during the 1990s, firms continued to grant the same number of
stock options year after year even as their stock prices doubled, causing the
value of incentive grants to balloon. Had pay plans been tightly focused on
performance sensitivity, the number of options would have been cut back as
the market rose. In contrast, when the market fell after 2000, option value
decreased in lockstep with it. Had the value of the grants been the center of
attention, rather than the absolute number of shares granted, further
adjustments would have been required. 141 (Indeed, if management were allpowerful, the market decline by itself should have caused a gross-up in the
numbers.) For Jensen and Murphy, this "free lunch" fallacy does a better job
of accounting for practices during the past decade and a half than executive

140. Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 37 39.
141. See id. at 37.
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empowerment. They also look to lack of sophistication to explain the absence
of indexing: prior to 2005,142 firms were required under GAAP to expense the

value of indexed options from their earnings, while no deduction was
required for fixed-price, unindexed options. It follows that boards gave up
performance sensitivity not because they were dominated but because they
were naively fixated on earnings per share (EPS), and the applicable GAAP
was badly articulated.43
Murphy takes this a step farther, folding the free lunch fallacy into the fair
deal story. The firm grants options not to incentivize, but because it
mistakenly believes them to be cheap compensation.44 It follows that
concessions keyed to the managers' risk aversion-the fixed price set at
market and the absence of restraints on alienation-bother the firm little
because it does not view them as costly. The manager would prefer an
exercise price set below market; the firm would prefer an exercise price above
market; and they split the difference when they set the price at the market.45
This analysis suffers from the same infirmity as the substantive defense in
chief. The mistaken perception of low cost starts out as a positive observation
that counters the power description, casting board decisionmaking in the
positive light of good faith. But the observation ends up as a statement of
purpose, and the purpose is compensation taken alone. The transformation
creates a normative problem. Given that stock options are intrinsically
inefficient when viewed only as compensation, a board that proceeds on this
basis and trades away incentive properties may be making a bad deal.
The lack of sophistication resonates better as pure description. Of course,
one can only go so far in depicting board members as dumb money. But the
characterization still carries due to the agency context: board members are not
trading for their own accounts when approving compensation packages, and
they operate in a cooperative environment. Given these qualifications, it is
plausible to model businesspeople reacting differently to cash and scrip. At
the same time, EPS matters in the boardroom because it matters to noise
traders in the markets. A boardroom seminar on basic financial economics
accordingly would fall short as a cure. For whatever reason-and the fact that
someone else's money is being spent provides a good reason-the economic
costs of equity kickers are not perceived as equivalent to those of cash
payments.
142. See SIIARE BASED PAYMLNT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).
143. Murphy 1998, supra note 4, at 21.
144. Murphy 2002, supra note 134, at 865 66.
145. Id.
at 863 64.
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Admitting lack of sophistication into the picture detracts from the power
explanation only if we define power narrowly as the authority to direct the
actions of others, the power possessed by a sovereign or a military superior. If
we relax the definition and describe power in terms of a position to exploit
others economically, lack of sophistication fits neatly into the power
description. The unequal bargaining power described in contract law is power
in this lesser mode. It is also the mode of empowerment referenced by the
critics.

3.

Substantial Performance

The third defense makes still more concessions. Just as management
power is hard to prove, so is its presence hard to deny. Many defenders
accordingly concede it a place in the institutional description.4 6 Some even
concede that some managers take excessive rewards, that equity
compensation is more liquid than shareholders would want, and that perverse
incentives have cropped up in the form of accounting manipulation.4 The
dispute goes to the normative implications of the diagnosis of systemic
imperfection. Here is the question: To what extent does the system succeed
or fail in cost-effectively channeling the energy of empowered managers to
productive ends that serve the shareholder interest? To answer the question is
to make a judgment call. Defenders of the practice make a three-part case for
relative success.
The first part of the defensive case takes a broad view and looks at the
bright side. Shareholders, it is said, should be pleased with the way things
have gone in the last decade and a half. Returns, measured net of the cost of
executive compensation, have been generally higher since the switch to
option-based compensation. And the shift did succeed in aligning
management interests with those of the shareholders to a greater extent than
in the past. Meanwhile, from 1992 to 2000, growth of gross domestic product

146. See Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at 27 28 (reporting sympathy with the view that
pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards, but contending that rent

extraction is not a compelling explanation); Holmstrim & Kaplan, supra note 1, at 13
(agreeing that the biggest payees use positions of power to command excessive awards);
Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 54 (recommending changes in structural and
psychological envhonment and noting that "changes in these practices will requhe a major
change in the power relationship between the board and the CEO"); see also John E. Core
et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation IneffcientPay withoutPejformance?103 MIcii. L. REv. 1142,
1160 61 (2005) (agreeing that pay structures reflect power and a positive correlation
between power and pay).
147. Holmstrim & Kaplan, supra note 1, at 3 4, 12 14.
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in the U.S. was higher than in any of Italy, France, Britain, Germany, or
14
Japan. 8
Defenders also point to governance improvements initiated in the 1990s.
Boards became smaller and more independent, shareholders became more
vigilant, compensation committees became the norm, and federal disclosure
regulations required greater transparency than ever before. 149 Shareholders
apparently welcomed the shift to option compensation as they enjoyed the
bull market of the 1990s. In contrast, a much smaller net-pay increase to
management during the 1980s triggered a populist backlash, due to the
1
association of high salaries with layoffs, plant closings, and downsizing. 11
Finally, the defenders argue that problems with executive compensation
after the year 2000 mainly concern a few cases of abuse, and that any
breakdowns due to the strain of the 1990s boom market have been addressed
quickly.151 Cases where high pay and poor performance coincide can be
identified statistically and dealt with accordingly. The existence of bad apples
does not compel the conclusion that the whole economy suffers from
1 52
governance problems.
No one on either side of the debate questions any of these points. The
matter comes down to a dispute over the characterization accorded to a
system that is admittedly dysfunctional. There is no objective resolution.
Meanwhile, the whole discussion deflects attention from the important
question: Assuming that equity incentive compensation can be better
designed, should it be better designed? The answer clearly is yes.
CONCLUSION

To the extent equity incentive compensation turns managers into
speculative shareholders, supersize pay will yield perverse effects. Redirecting
incentives to the investment mode of shareholding cures those problems but
creates new ones. A compensation plan designed to create manager-investors
delays supersize cash payoffs in order to keep the focus on long-term
fundamental value. The delay reduces the value of the compensation package.
148. Id. at 3-4.
149. Hall & Murphy 2003, supra note 72, at 27 28.
150. Murphy 1998, supra note 4, at 1. Moreover, in Jensen & Murphy 2004, supra note 2, at 1,
the authors point out the resurgence of outrage directed at the amount of pay in
connection with recent scandals. They are impressed by the negative publicity attracted b%
the Jack Welch and Richard Grasso rethement packages, noting that nobody questioned
the quality of the performance of either.
151. See id. at3 4.
152. Core et al., supra note 146, at 1166.
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One must then ask whether the purpose of "incentive compensation" is
actually to incentivize, or merely to compensate. To the extent that the
answer is "both," perverse effects remain a constant possibility. It is time to
raise the bar and emphasize incentives. Incentive compatibility should be the
first priority, with the level of compensation being fixed in a framework that
lacks foreseeable perverse effects.

